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ABSTRACT: This paper presents a brief description of vehicular congestion in Medellin, Colombia, and discusses the need to implement 
congestion pricing (CP) from an economic point of view. It describes the license plate-based traffic restriction (Pico y Placa) in the city, 
showing that the measure is palliative, and that the implementation of CP is necessary. A cost-benefit analysis is presented to assess the effects 
of implementing a hypothetical CP strategy based on data from previous studies. The first-best solution for CP is presented, and considered 
as the optimal policy for deciding on the congestion rate that would maximize social welfare. The main finding is that the net benefit of 
implementation costs is positive. Therefore, the implementation of a CP strategy is recommended to improve the efficiency of road infrastructure 
use in the city based on economic principles. Finally, a set of recommendations for improving the city’s mobility in the future are presented.
KEYWORDS: congestion pricing, cost-benefit analysis, Medellin, vehicular restriction
RESUMEN: Se presenta una breve descripción de la congestión vehicular en Medellín, y la necesidad de implementar el sistema de peaje 
por congestión (PC) desde una óptica económica. Se describe la restricción a la circulación vehicular del “Pico y Placa,” mostrando que la 
medida es paliativa y que es necesaria la implementación del PC. Se realiza un análisis costo-beneficio para valorar los efectos de implementar 
una estrategia en forma hipotética de PC basado en datos de investigaciones. La mejor solución debida al PC es presentada y considerada 
como lo óptimo para lograr encontrar la tasa de congestión que maximiza el bienestar social. El principal hallazgo es que el beneficio neto de 
la implementación es positivo. Por lo tanto, se recomienda la implementación del PC para mejorar la eficiencia en el uso de la infraestructura 
vial en la ciudad basado en principios económicos. Finalmente, se presentan algunas recomendaciones para mejorar la movilidad en la ciudad.
PALABRAS CLAVE: peaje por congestión, análisis costo-beneficio, Medellín, restricción vehicular
1.  INTRODUCTION
Growth of traffic volumes has increased in recent 
decades in almost all cities in the world, augmenting 
congestion, and this is why transportation engineers 
must try to solve the situation suggesting the investment 
on road infrastructure and/or creating policies to avoid 
the increase of this transportation externality. Traffic 
congestion is a natural consequence of supply and 
demand: road capacity is time-consuming and costly to 
build, and is fixed for long time periods. The demand 
fluctuates over time, and transportation services are 
continuous, they cannot easily be stopped to smooth 
imbalances between capacity and demand; thus, 
congestion has to be studied to try to enhance mobility 
and accessibility.
The phenomena of congestion and pollution are 
currently the most important problems in urban 
transportation. Congestion is produced when the 
interference between users of a system leads to losses 
for all of them. Travel speed decreases according to 
the density on the road and increases with its capacity 
or width. In fact, the higher the concentration of 
vehicles, the more interference is produced, causing 
slowdowns for all users. On the other hand, increasing 
capacity mitigates interferences and increases travel 
speed [1]. In this sense, the evidence has shown González-Calderón et al 124
that the construction of new infrastructure is not the 
only alternative for coping with congestion [2]. New 
infrastructure will induce increased vehicle volumes 
compared to traffic forecasts made by planners. In 
general, solutions implemented in Latin American 
cities are aimed at solving the previously mentioned 
problems in a pragmatic fashion sometimes due to a 
lack of resources. So it is necessary to analyze, for each 
strategy, the size of the effect, operating costs, factors 
of increased travel time, and pollution, in order to solve 
or diminish the phenomenon of congestion.
Medellin, with 2,200,000 inhabitants, is part of a 
metropolitan area that has 3,300,000 inhabitants [3]. 
Buses, taxis, and the Metro de Medellín serve as public 
transportation in the city. According to the Valle de 
Aburra’s 2005 Origin-Destination Survey, 4.8 million 
journeys take place every day (34% buses, 10% Metro, 
13% automobile, and 43% others) [4]. In order to 
improve mobility in the city, by integrating the Metro 
stations with different sectors of the city, a new Bus 
Rapid Transit (BRT)–Metroplús– system is being 
implemented. In this city, traffic congestion has made 
the roads chaotic at peak hours. The automobile fleet is 
constantly increasing in an uncontrolled fashion: new 
private cars and taxis join the existing vehicles and 
public service vehicles (buses, vans, and minibuses). 
The result, in addition to congestion, is increased noise 
and pollution in the city. 
It is noted that Medellin has serious transport problems, 
especially in the absence of adequate infrastructure 
and strategies for enhancing mobility in the city. In 
2004, some traffic studies were performed on strategic 
corridors. The average speed calculated was 22.1 km/h 
in the morning peak period and 17 km/h in the evening 
peak period. The average travel time in public transport 
was 35 minutes over an average distance of 8.75 km. 
Speeds on the public transport network ranged between 
5 and 26 km/h [5]. The lower speeds were presented in 
the downtown area, with values between 5 and 13 km/h; 
these low speeds are due to traffic congestion and transit 
routing convergence in the area [6]. These results reflect 
the critical situation of congestion levels in the city. 
From another perspective, congestion pricing (CP)–
sometimes called value pricing–is a way of harnessing 
the power of the market to reduce the loss associated 
with traffic congestion [7]. Congestion pricing works 
by shifting purely discretionary rush hour highway 
travel to other transportation modes or to off-peak 
periods, taking advantage of the fact that the majority 
of rush hour drivers on a typical urban highway are not 
commuters. Congestion pricing benefits drivers and 
businesses by reducing delays and stress, increasing 
the predictability of trip times, and allowing for 
more deliveries per hour. It benefits mass transit by 
improving transit speeds and the reliability of transit 
services, increasing transit ridership, and lowering costs 
for transit providers. 
Taking into account the above information, the main 
purpose of this paper is to demonstrate the necessity of 
implementing CP in Medellin, to overcome its mobility 
problems and the current inefficiency of the Pico y 
Placa restriction. The Cost-Benefit Analysis (CBA) 
proposed exposes the benefits of implementing CP in 
Medellin, for a specific sector of the city with a high 
volume of vehicles. This paper is organized as follows: 
The analytical framework on congestion pricing is 
presented in Section 2. Section 3 explains the Pico y 
Placa restriction in Medellin and its evolution over 
time. Section 4 describes a congestion pricing study 
in Medellin. Section 5 develops a cost-benefit analysis 
of the congestion pricing in the city. Finally, the main 
findings of this research are summarized and discussed 
in Section 6.
2.  CONGESTION PRICING
Interest in CP has been revived extensively by 
economists and transportation researchers in recent 
years because of the growing prominence and changing 
nature of the urban transportation problem facing a 
modern city [8]. A basic economic principle is that 
consumers should pay directly for the costs they 
impose as an incentive to use resources efficiently. 
Congestion imposes various costs on travelers: 
reduced speeds and increased travel times, a decrease 
in travel time reliability, greater fuel consumption and 
vehicle wear, inconvenience from rescheduling trips 
or using alternative travel modes, and the costs of 
relocating residences and jobs. The strategy to reach 
this objective is to impose on users a charge equivalent 
to the marginal cost of congestion they cause. This 
strategy induces changes in mode choice and route 
choice that lead to an optimum use of the network [1]. 
The former strategy is especially valid for urban areas Dyna 171, 2012 125
where charging for the use of road infrastructure on a 
time interval enables traffic demand to be controlled.
Various policies to curb traffic congestion have been 
adopted or proposed over the years. The traditional 
response is to expand capacity by building new roads 
or upgrading existing ones. A second method is to 
reduce demand by discouraging peak-period travel, 
limiting access to congested areas by using permit 
systems and parking restrictions, imposing bans on 
commercial vehicles during certain hours, and so on. A 
third approach is to improve the efficiency of the road 
system, so that the same demand can be accommodated 
at a lower cost. Re-timing of traffic lights, metering 
access to highway entrance ramps, high-occupancy 
vehicle lanes and advanced traveler information 
systems are examples of such measures [9]. Also, it has 
been argued that one of the key benefits of pricing for 
road space is to increase the reliability of journey times 
and therefore produce significant resource savings [10].
Congestion pricing has welfare distributional effects on 
travelers that tend to help those people with high time 
values. Because time value is positively correlated with 
income, CP is consistent with the conventional view 
that tolling is regressive. The theoretical background of 
CP has relied on the fundamental economic principle of 
marginal-cost pricing, which states that road users using 
congested roads should pay a toll equal to the difference 
between the marginal-social cost and the marginal-private 
cost in order to maximize social net benefit. Figure 1 
 
Figure 1. Marginal-cost pricing for congestion
[8] shows that the average cost (AC) curve represents 
the average (private) cost of congestion at each level 
of demand (number of trips accomplished), and the 
marginal cost (MC) curve represents the marginal cost 
which is the additional cost of adding one extra vehicle 
or trip to the traffic stream. Marginal costs may be seen 
as “social costs” in the limited sense that they are the 
costs to the society of road users [8].
Yang and Huang [8] explain that any individual user 
entering the road will only consider the costs (AC) he 
or she personally bears. A driver will either be unaware 
of, or unwilling to consider, the external congestion 
costs that he or she imposes on the other road users. 
Therefore, the MC curve relates to the marginal social 
cost for the new trip-maker and the existing road users 
of an addition to the traffic flow, while the AC curve is 
equivalent to the marginal private cost or the additional 
cost borne and perceived by the new trip-maker alone. 
Button [11] shows that the difference between the AC 
and MC curves at any level of travel demand reflects 
the economic costs of congestion at that demand. Yang 
and Huang state that the optimal flow is, as we can 
see, equal to DG where marginal cost and demand are 
equated, while the actual demand when there is no toll 
tends to be DA because road users ignore the congestion 
that they impose on others. 
From a social point of view, the actual demand, DA, 
is excessive because the DA-th user is only enjoying 
a benefit of DAA, but imposing the costs of DAM. 
The additional traffic beyond the optimal level DG 
can be seen to be generating costs equal to the area 
DAMGDG, but only enjoying a benefit equal to the area 
DAAGDG, so a deadweight welfare loss of the AMG 
area is apparent. A demand level lower than DG is also 
sub-optimal because the potential consumer surplus 
gained from trip-making is not being fully exploited. 
Therefore, the optimal toll to be charged is equal to 
BG. Under this toll charge, the economic benefit, as 
given by the area BGETB (total user benefit minus total 
social cost), will be maximized.
The purpose of a congestion price from the economic 
point of view is to maximize the economic benefit at 
an aggregate level. The economic benefit or welfare, 
Eq. (1), is composed of the consumer surplus, Eq. (2), 
and the producer surplus, Eq. (3). The production cost 
function is represented by the integral of the marginal 
cost with respect to flow, as shown in Eq. (4). Setting 
the derivative of welfare, Eq. (5), to zero in Eq. (6), it González-Calderón et al 126
can be observed in Eq. (7) that the price maximizing the 
welfare is the marginal cost for a competitive market.
      ( 1 )
      ( 2 )
    ( 3 )
     ( 4 )
 
(5)
 
(6)
      ( 7 )
As the user only perceives the average cost, the way to 
maximize the welfare is to charge a congestion price 
that makes the average cost for the user equal to the 
marginal cost of production. This price is called the 
“Pigouvian tax” [12],which was the first term used for 
road pricing. Therefore the congestion price represents 
the difference between the average cost (cost perceived 
by the user or private cost) and the marginal cost (that 
which is perceived by the system, the social cost). 
3.  LICENSE PLATE-BASED TRAFFIC 
RESTRICTION (“PEAK AND PLATE”) IN 
MEDELLIN
The license plate-based traffic restriction “peak and 
plate” is an operational measure by a transportation 
authority for restricting the circulation of vehicles 
during peak hours, according to the final digit of 
a vehicle’s plate. These restrictions have been 
implemented in Latin America in the last 25 years 
with different objectives, most of them related to 
environmental reasons. In Bogota (Colombia) the Pico 
y Placa was implemented in 1998, but at that time the 
main purpose was to reduce congestion in the rush 
hours [13].
The problem of congestion in Medellin is not a recent 
problem, it has been latent in the everyday life of 
the city for several years, and therefore the local 
government has implemented some measures to try to 
mitigate its impact on mobility and transport by seeking 
to increase the road capacity to achieve better mobility in 
the city (with the enlargement of lanes, new roads, new 
junctions, etc.). The most important of those measures 
is a license plate-based traffic restriction named Pico y 
Placa which has been applied in Medellin since 2005. 
The purpose of Pico y Placa is to restrict the movement 
of private cars according to the final digit of the 
license plate (except in some cases for services such as 
ambulances, state workers, school transport, and others. 
Additionally, some corridors are also exempted from 
Pico y Placa in order to guarantee regional connectivity 
during rush hours in the morning (6:30 to 8:30 am), 
and afternoon (5:30 to 7:30 pm). 
The restriction seeks to achieve the following benefits: 
a) To discourage the use of private transport and 
decrease overall travel times for the vehicles circulating 
in these hours, b) To increase the use of public 
transport. c) To reduce the risk of accidents. And, d) 
to reduce pollution. However, Gonzalez-Calderon[14] 
and Posada et al. [15] showed that this restriction is 
palliative, and by 2012 its effectiveness will be null. 
Posada et al. [15] proposes an ex-post facto impact 
assessment of the Pico y Placa policy in the city of 
Medellin. The authors found that the effect of the 
measure reduces congestion at rush hours, but moves it 
to the off-rush hours, creating a constant rush (though 
not as heavy as rush hours). Also, they asserted that 
the same effects could be achieved with congestion 
pricing, whereby people would have the opportunity 
to choose what to do, instead of a prohibition on using 
the car (Pico y Placa restriction).
3.1  Analysis of the evolution over time of the Pico 
y Placa system
Gonzalez-Calderon  [14]  and  Posada  et  al.  [15] 
pointed out that the measure only works for a few 
years. The authors showed that in 2008 the measure 
had to be reassessed because the number of vehicles 
circulating reached the initial level of congestion. In 
2008 the restriction was extended to four plates per 
day; i.e., 40% restriction. Again, in 2012 the number 
of vehicles circulating will reach the baseline [14,15].   
For that reason, CP must be considered.Dyna 171, 2012 127
3.2  Microeconomic analysis of the Pico y Placa 
policy
A microeconomic analysis of the policy shows that the 
restriction produces a loss in the consumer surplus that 
in the long term is compensated by the dynamics of the 
market, with the downside that old vehicles remain in 
use. Cantillo [13] presents an economic assessment of 
the restriction policy. In fact, the restriction produces a 
displacement of the demand curve to the left that leads 
to a reduction in the quantity consumed (traffic flow). 
Assuming that this new equilibrium is equivalent to a 
second-optimum, this means that the displacement of 
the demand curve causes a reduction in the quantity 
consumed. This quatity is equivalent to the reduction, 
that would cause an increase in the cost curve from 
private costs to social costs (corresponding to the 
externalities). This reduction in the quantity consumed 
produces a loss in consumer surplus. Cantillo [13] 
assumes that in the best case this loss could be 
compensated by the recovery of the deadweight loss 
produced by externalities. The problem highlighted by 
the author is that the reduction in the quantity consumed 
obeys a restriction so that the willingness of consumers 
to pay is higher than the payment reflected by the actual 
demand curve, which produces a new switch in the 
demand curve (reflected by an increase in the purchases 
of vehicles with license plates that enable users to use 
them on the days they have the restriction).  In the 
long term, the policy does not have a positive effect 
because the demand will tend to be the same, but the 
new vehicles will have lower technical specifications.
4.  CONGESTION PRICING IN MEDELLIN
Gonzalez-Calderon and Ospina [6] conducted a survey 
to analyze the Pico y Placa measure in the city of 
Medellin, using stated preference methods. Laureles 
neighborhood was the area chosen for conducting the 
study. It is one of the areas with the greatest number 
of vehicles in the city, so it makes a big contribution 
to general traffic congestion [14]. It was found that 
private drivers are not in agreement with the Pico y 
Placa measure, but that the traffic level of service in 
the city was improved with its implementation. The 
results show the market share of mode transport due 
to congestion: 48% of the users would prefer to share 
a vehicle with other people for comfort; 37% would 
choose the bus, since it provides a good service, 
although it is affected by lack of safety; 9% would 
travel to their place of destination by taxi, since it is 
comfortable and safe; and the remaining 6% would use 
the Metro combined with a taxi, involving a mandatory 
transfer when the destination is a long distance away.
For many people, the use of a car is absolutely 
necessary. Many respondents asserted they did not 
stop driving and did not care about the fines, as they 
made many trips in their private car during the day. 
In the same study, Gonzalez-Calderon [14] explains 
that a survey was conducted asking the drivers about 
their willingness to pay a fee to lift the Pico y Placa 
restriction on the day that the driver is affected by the 
restriction (as  congestion pricing). Thus the driver 
would decide whether it was more favorable to pay 
or to leave the car at home. The option would be for 
the driver to pay a fee to travel in the city during rush 
hours. And, if so, they would pay a fee of COP$15,000/
day (USD$7.50/day), COP$10,000/day (USD$5.00/
day), or COP$5,000/day (USD$2.50/day) to lift the 
restriction. This is a kind of measure of willingness to 
pay a congestion charge at peak times for travel during 
those hours. The results of the survey show a large 
negative response to paying the congestion fee for the 
day that corresponds to the vehicle restrictions (63%); 
the remaining (37%) stated that they would pay a fee 
(USD$2.50/day). For more information, refer to [14]. 
If this fee (toll) is applied for a year; i.e., in a period 
of 50 weeks with 250,000 vehicles in Medellin, the 
government will have a yearly income approximately 
USD$11,562,500 (for the restriction of 2 plates per 
day and one day per week) and USD$46,250,000 (for 
the restriction of 4 plates per day and two days per 
week), taking into account that administration cost, 
fees, etc. have to be deducted. It is known that 1 km 
of Metroplús (BRT for Medellin) cost approximately 
USD$3.5 million [14]. Also, it is known that the city 
contributes 30% of expenditures for public works, and 
so approximately 19 km of Metroplús roads could be 
constructed in about a year with the current restriction. 
On the other hand, gasoline becomes more expensive 
every day, so many users could travel by public 
transport, as it is done in big metropolises. From this, 
it can be stated that the Pico y Placa can be combined 
with (or replaced by) the option of paying a congestion 
charge for driving at peak hours for those who want to 
avoid the driving ban. This would generate significant González-Calderón et al 128
revenue for the local authority, which would finance 
new roads for the Metroplús BRT. 
It is unclear as yet from the limited formal research 
whether drivers would be better off in terms of expected 
travel costs under nonresponsive or responsive 
pricing. Some surveys have found that drivers dislike 
uncertainty about how much they will have to pay 
in tolls. Aversion to uncertainty about payment was 
one of the reasons for opposition to the congestion 
metering project planned for Cambridge, England, in 
which vehicles would have been charged on the basis 
of actual congestion experienced.
5.  COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS OF CONGESTION 
PRICING IN MEDELLIN
The methodology adopted to produce the CBA of the 
CP in Medellin is based on Prud’homme and Bocarejo 
[16]. In that study, the authors used pre-charge and 
post-charge data on speed and road usage in the 
London congestion charge zone to estimate demand 
and cost curves for road usage. In the current study, the 
objective is to estimate the benefits and the cost that the 
implementation of CP policy in Medellin would bring. 
The first step is to derive demand and supply curves, in 
order to estimate social surplus, consumer surplus, and 
welfare obtained from the hypothetic policy. Further 
assumptions made will be explained later. 
The main limitation to producing a CBA of the policy in 
Medellin is the lack of data. Prud’homme and Bocarejo 
implemented this model using data before and after 
implementing congestion pricing. In our case, a survey 
was conducted in a zone of Medellin where the most 
vehicle trips are produced (Laureles). In Medellin, two 
zones have the highest levels of congestion: the Central 
Business District (CBD, where congestion is caused by 
buses) and El Poblado (where it is caused by private 
vehicles) which is a mixed land use zone (residential 
and commercial. This motivated the authors to center 
the CBA focusing on El Poblado zone. So the analysis 
will focus on the trips made from Laureles to El Poblado. 
1. Demand in study zone: The demand curve for non-
commercial vehicles in Laureles is estimated using 
the willingness of people from this zone to pay. An 
assumption is made here, because the results are not 
segregated by destination. In fact, people having as 
destination El Poblado could have a higher willingness 
to pay than people having another zone as their 
destination. The hypothetical scenario used in this 
paper considers a congestion charging (CH) equal to 
USD$2.00 per day. For more information about this 
scenario, refer to Gonzalez-Calderon [14]. As can be 
seen in the analysis of the CP below, this fee is too 
low; further research will focus on different scenarios 
with different rates. 
The first point of the demand curve is estimated using 
the origin-destination matrix of Medellin [4]. The first 
point (B) is obtained for the base case in 2005. In this 
case, it was found that B = 104,000 veh. km/day. In order 
to obtain the demand in the hypothetical scenario where 
CP is implemented, the demand B is multiplied by the 
percentage of people who responded in the survey that 
they were willing to pay the charge CH to use the road. 
The percentage of people with destination El Poblado 
not willing to pay USD$2.00 to use their car was 13% 
[14]. The demand for the hypothetical scenario would 
then be C = 0.87 * 104,000 = 90,480 veh. km.
2. Cost curves for the charged zone: It is now necessary 
to calculate the cost curve, expressed in dollars per veh. 
km. The cost function can be calculated in terms of 
operational costs (such as fuel and amortization), and 
the value of time spent driving 1 km. The fixed cost is 
composed of average costs of purchase, maintenance, 
repairs, insurance, and salvage cost, as presented in 
Table 1. Assuming a period of 15 years and 10,000 km 
of car use pr year, the fixed cost per kilometer obtained 
is: USD$37,565.00/150,000 km = USD$0.25/km.
Table 1. Fixed cost of having a car for 15 years 
For the variable part, a function relating flow and 
travel time is used to compute travel cost for a specific 
volume. A complete analysis could determine the 
change of speed per link using the Bureau of Public Dyna 171, 2012 129
Roads (BPR) formula [17]. For simplicity, a linear function 
is considered for the overall network affected. As explained 
by Prud’homme and Bocarejo [16], it is possible to relate 
speed and flow, because the average speed on a network 
follows a linear relation with flow. The function specification 
is:. In order to calculate the parameters of the function, two 
points need to be found: the free flow speed and another 
speed for a known flow. The speed for the base case scenario 
and the free flow speed were calculated using a proportional 
traffic assignment of Medellin O-D matrix in TransCAD® 
for the zones studied. Free flow speed: s (0) = 33.6 km/
hour. For a flow B = 104,000 veh. km/day, the speed is s 
(104,000) = 15 km/hour. So the equation becomes:  in km/
hour. The time value is then multiplied by the inverse of the 
speed. The time value for Medellin drivers was assumed to 
be USD$10.00/hour, as shown in Moreno et al.[18]. 
The total private cost can be expressed by Eq. (8):
  (8)
The social cost curve S(q) is then estimated using P(q), 
by summing the private cost P(q), and the product 
of the flow and the marginal cost imposed by a new 
user entering the network (i.e., P›(q) multiplied by the 
demand flow (q) as described in Eqs. (9) and (10):
    (9)
  (10)
3. Demand curve: From Section 1 we have the demand 
flows for two different scenarios with different associated 
costs. The next step is therefore to determine the equation 
relating the demand flows to the prices. As we know, the 
base case scenario is associated with a demand flow of 
B = 104,000 veh. km/day and a price of .
  
Similarly, the hypothetical scenario with CP is associated 
with a demand flow C = 90,480 veh. km and a price. 
For the hypothetical scenario with congestion pricing, 
the cost is calculated as a summation of the fixed cost, 
the variable cost of using the network and the average 
congestion charge. The average congestion charge can 
be obtained by dividing the total fee (USD$2.00) into 
the average distance driven by the user “av”. For the 
zones studied, the average distance driven per vehicle 
each day between Laureles and El Poblado is av = 6.5 
km/day. Now, we have a demand curve D(q) with two 
points, B (104,000; 0.92) and C (90,480; 1.13), and we 
assume the curve is linear. Now it is easy to calculate the 
demand curve equation: . Using cost-benefit theory and 
the equations of private cost, social cost, and demand for 
the different scenarios, we can determine the coordinates 
of all the points represented in Fig. 2, and produce Table 2.
Figure 2. Road congestion with a congestion charge
The optimal situation is obtained when the demand 
curve and the social cost curve intersect, that is when 
S (q) = D (q). Congestion costs are defined as BCA in 
the case of the pre-charge situation, and as BB’’B’ in 
the case of the congestion price situation. By definition, 
congestion costs are zero in the case of the optimal 
situation. In principle, these costs are defined as the 
difference between the integrals of the social cost curve 
and the demand curve over the YX (or Y’X) values 
of q. The collection cost was assumed as USD$2.00/
day because only on three arteries in the city that have 
access to El Poblado zone are needed, and not as a ring 
scheme like in London (that is much more expensive). 
The benefits of the charge policy are the reduction in 
congestion costs, relative to the base case scenario. 
The results are summarized in Table 2, showing how 
important congestion costs in the charged zone are 
before the introduction of the charge (present situation).González-Calderón et al 130
Congestion costs in the base scenario (2005) amounted 
to about USD$8,200 per chargeable day. This is about 
USD$2 million per year (excluding congestion on 
weekends and other days excluded from the congestion 
charge). This is what a congestion charge is expected to 
eliminate, and this elimination is the main benefit of such 
a system. Congestion costs can also be related to the utility 
derived from motor vehicle usage. This utility is equal to 
what users pay, plus the consumer surplus they obtain, 
represented by area RAXO in Fig. 2. In 2005, this can be 
estimated as USD$179,400per day, to be compared with 
the USD$8,260 dollars per day of congestion costs. Thus, 
in 2005, traffic congestion costs represented about 4.5% 
of the utility generated by traffic in the same year. In the 
case of environmental benefits, with the implementation 
of the CP in Medellin, less veh. km at a lower speed will 
be circulation, meaning less pollutants produced, and 
lower pollution costs. However, this study is for only one 
congested area, trips from Laureles. The environmental 
benefits have to be assessed with all the vehicles in the 
city, because air quality depends upon total emissions.
Table 2. Congestion pricing cost and benefits for different scenarios (cars only)
It can be seen from Table 2 that the number of veh. km 
decreased by USD$13,520 thousand (104-90.48) per 
day. Following the steps of Prud’homme and Bocarejo 
[16], we can take the official French value of pollution 
costs in dense urban areas of  USD$40 per 1,000 veh. 
km, and USD$10 per 1,000 veh. km in reduction 
of CO2 emissions; this translates into USD$540.80/
day or USD$137,904/year, and USD$135.20/day or 
USD$34,476/year, respectively. 
The total environmental benefits generated by the 
congestion charge (ignoring additional emissions) 
can be estimated at USD$172,380/year. The standard 
economic theory of congestion ignores management 
and collection costs, and assumes them to be zero. 
In Table 2, it looks only at the line ‘benefits’, sees 
a positive number, and concludes that the scheme 
is justified (benefits net of costs > 0).Therefore, the 
implementation of a CP strategy is recommended to 
improve the efficiency of road infrastructure use in the 
city, based on economic principles.
Finally, Prud’homme and Bocarejo [16] explained 
that CP policy was introduced jointly with another 
measure: a significant increase in bus supply. The authors 
concluded that the two policy measures were obviously 
complementary because without new buses, bus crowding 
would have increased, comfort on bus journeys would 
have declined, and therefore a modification in modal 
split would have been more difficult to produce. The city 
of Medellin could experience a similar situation when 
applying CP scheme while incorporating new buses of 
the new BRT system, Metroplús (this is going to happen 
in 2012). This reinforces the need to implement CP 
in Medellin, because the transit system is going to be 
improved, and drivers will have more alternatives for 
commuting besides the automobile.
6.  CONCLUSIONS
The Pico y Placa is a temporary measure and alone it will 
not solve the underlying problem of mobility in Medellin. 
However, for future years, it is necessary to provide different 
options, such as accessible public transport, and to provide 
a safe and efficient infrastructure for non-motorized modes 
of transport, such as walking or cycling. For this reason, 
congestion pricing is proposed as a solution that has been 
successfully applied in other congested cities like London. 
When there is a restriction on circulation (Pico y 
Placa), people prefer to continue using their own cars 
and choose to travel during off-peak hours. The same Dyna 171, 2012 131
effects could be achieved with congestion pricing. In 
this case, all drivers have the opportunity to choose 
what to do, and there is no prohibition on using the car.
A CBS has been carried out to assess the implementation 
of congestion pricing in Medellin, based on data from 
previous surveys and the origin-destination matrix of 
the city, including the zones with higher car density. 
The CBA considers the traffic situation in 2005 and 
the effects of implementing a hypothetical congestion 
pricing strategy. The first-best solution for congestion 
pricing is presented, and found to be the optimal 
policy for determining the congestion rate that would 
maximize social welfare. The main finding is that net 
benefits of implementation| costs are positive (about 
USD$2,510/day and USD$3,260/day for the congestion 
price and optimal situation, respectively). Therefore, 
the implementation of a CP strategy is recommended 
to improve the efficiency of road infrastructure use in 
the city, based on economic principles.
This is the first known study conducted in Medellin for 
the implementation of a congestion pricing scheme, 
and it is a preliminary assessment of the measure. We 
recommend conducting the CBA for more zones within 
the city in order to obtain more accurate data before 
implementing the CP scheme in Medellin.
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